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Abstract
The design of an interactive robot should make crucial reference to the observed 
properties of  human interaction. Obviously, human communicative interaction varies 
across languages and cultures, but remarkably uniform is the basic organization of in-
teractive language use: participants take short turns at talking while avoiding overlap; 
they utilize a basic inventory of action–response pairs (e.g., question–answer), which 
can be recursively employed; they have systematic backup systems for communicative 
diffi culties and deploy multimodal signals (speech,  gesture,  facial expression,  gaze) 
to disambiguate or reinforce intended content. This chapter spells out these design 
properties and makes the point that human comprehension is fundamentally predic-
tive, and has to be so to achieve the typically rapid response times despite the large 
latencies involved in generating speech. These properties may pose a substantial, even 
insuperable, hurdle for a fully humanoid interactive robot, but fortunately humans 
are excellent at adapting to interactants with restricted capabilities, such as children, 
foreigners, or aphasics.
Introduction
Humans appear to involve themselves effortlessly in  social  interaction with 
their peers and are capable of rapidly integrating novel tasks and routines 
into these interactions. Clearly, efforts to build machines that might assist 
humans in varied tasks have much to learn from an analytic grasp of what 
makes humans so seamlessly able to conduct cooperative task management, 
even when it is novel. Right at the start, a caveat is in order: the domain of the 
study of human communicative interaction is still in its infancy; it is a fi eld 
that has been dominated by a few maverick pioneers, and has only recently 
112 S. C. Levinson 
acquired the extensive public databases and measurements typical of cumu-
lative science. Although our understanding of human–human interaction is 
still quite limited, what we know already makes the prospects for seamless 
 human–machine interaction quite remote. I will at the end, however, suggest 
that emulating humans may not in fact be the most productive use of new 
technologies, if indeed it is possible at all. The body of this chapter tries to 
delineate what we know about human interactive skills (see also Thomaz et 
al., this volume).
The proverbial Martian arriving on Earth would quickly notice that humans 
have the propensity to huddle in a face-to-face arrangement and engage in a 
curious exchange of alternating short bursts of communicative activity. S/he 
would also note that in this regard there are plenty of parallels with other spe-
cies (e.g., the vocal duetting of many types of songbirds and many species of 
primates). Those other species tend, however, to have a small, relatively fi xed 
repertoire of signals, whereas it would rapidly become self-evident that such 
is not the case for humans. Human repertoires are not only immense, they also 
vary signifi cantly across ethnic groups or cultures. Moreover, it would be obvi-
ous that human exchanges happen in myriad different contexts, apparently aid-
ing numerous types of endeavor. Beyond that, the system might be inscrutable. 
Let us try here to analytically unpack this a bit.
Basic Ethological Properties of Human 
Communicative Interaction
The fundamental niche  for human communication is  social  interaction in a 
face-to-face context: this is the context in which  language is learned, the bulk 
of usage occurs, and almost certainly the context in which it has evolved. It 
is characterized by the rapid exchange of alternating short bursts of com-
munication (averaging ca. 2 sec) as well as by multimodality: the face, the 
hands, the deployment of the trunk as well as the vocal organs are typically 
all in play at once. One can look at the system from the point of view of 
 comprehension, in which case it is clear that the incoming multimodal sig-
nal is parsed in parallel and integrated extremely fast, also combining with 
numerous aspects of the context.  Gestures, for example, can be shown to be 
unifi ed with the linguistic message just as fast as they happen (Özyürek et al. 
2007). From a production perspective, the language system may be more se-
rial (Indefrey 2011): a message is composed and serially encoded, although 
the processing of each successive chunk can proceed in parallel as it passes 
through the many stages of encoding from message to linguistic form to 
articulation. However, once multimodal production is considered, it is clear 
that  facial expressions, manual gestures, and other bodily components must 
be produced in parallel but temporally integrated, much like a chamber or-
chestra would perform a score.
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Although the strictly linguistic aspects of comprehension have been exten-
sively studied experimentally, the multimodal aspects remain fairly obscure. 
Linguistic “strings” are often treated as linear—phonemes follow phonemes, 
words follow words—but clearly multimodal signals are delivered simultane-
ously and, in this regard, are like prosody and voice quality, offering different 
kinds of units at different parallel levels, but somehow integrated semantically 
and temporally. In addition, comprehension and production must work closely 
in consort, as the following considerations show, and this area has only re-
cently started to be explored.
As mentioned, interactive communication involves the rapid alternation of 
speaking roles. What is interesting about this is the cognitive load that is in-
volved. Across languages and across conversational corpora, the modal gap 
between turns is only 100–200 msec, quite literally in the blink of an eye. It 
takes at least 600 msec to crank up the language production machinery; that 
is, the time it takes from knowing what word you want to say until the time 
anything comes out of your mouth. For a simple clause, the latency is more 
like 1500 msec (for references, see Levinson 2016). The implication is clear: 
to respond so rapidly, the speaker must predict the content of the incoming 
turn and start early preparation of a response, as illustrated schematically in 
Figure 8.1. We have shown that the point of an utterance or the speech act 
is often predicted from the very fi rst words of an utterance (Gisladottir et al. 
2015). We have also shown, by using EEG, that the production system starts 
as soon as the point of the incoming turn becomes clear, as indicated in Figure 
8.1 (Bögels et al. 2015b) and then proceeds all the way through the various 
encoding stages. Thus,  predictive comprehension and language production 
have to work in overlap and in consort. Humans are not generally good at 
 multitasking,1 due in part to the working memory bottleneck, so  turn-taking 
must impose a heavy cognitive load.
The structure of interaction involves sequences of  speech acts (i.e., actions 
packaged up in linguistic and multimodal format). Humans clearly map lin-
guistic utterances into something action-like. Consider, for instance, “Can you 
reach the wine?” and its nonverbal response action. The pragmatic thrust, the 
point of an utterance, is only very indirectly related to its form. Thus English 
yes–no questions typically come in declarative format with falling prosody; 
the giveaway is often the manner in which the declarative is a statement about 
something that is more within the addressee’s epistemic domain (e.g., “you 
are feeling better”). The many-to-many mapping between linguistic form and 
speech act has been explored in corpora (e.g., Couper-Kuhlen 2014; Levinson 
2013a, 2017), and although inference can make use of varying probabilities, it 
is abductive in character involving many contextual parameters. For example, 
1 It is generally agreed that multitasking slows performance and increases errors, but the idea 
that true multitasking is impossible has required recent revision; for a review, see Fischer and 
Plessow (2015).
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an utterance like “Can we lift this?” could be a request for permission to re-
move something, an offer to help you with your suitcase, or an enquiry about 
the weight of something; apart from prosody, only contextual factors are likely 
to disambiguate. Outside restricted domains (e.g., travel agents, bank enqui-
ries) these inferences will be very challenging to model in  human–machine 
interaction.2
As noted, speech actions come in sequences and often occur as two paired 
actions (a so-called adjacency pair): following a question, an answer is due; 
following an offer, an acceptance or refusal is expected; following a request, 
an action or excuse will be forthcoming (see Exchange 1 and 2 below). Actions 
are thus often contingent on prior actions: “yes” only makes sense in rela-
tion to the prior query. The simple device of paired actions can, however, be 
recursively applied according to the template shown in Figure 8.2 (Kendrick 
et al., in prep.): FPP marks the fi rst part of a paired sequence of actions and 
SPP marks the second part, the response; each of the expansion types can also 
consist of pairs of actions (Schegloff 2007).
Consider the following exchange involving a question–answer pair embed-
ded within a question–answer pair:
2 A reviewer made the interesting point that the complexity of inference is narrowed in humans 
by the matching evolved design of sensors and effectors, and no doubt the cognition connect-
ing them: I know what is visually salient to you without complex calculation, but this may not 
be available to machines with their different perceptual systems. This may be a more serious 











Figure 8.1 Overlapping  comprehension and production processes during  turn-taking 
(after Levinson 2016).
 Natural Forms of Purposeful Interaction among Humans 115
Exchange 1
A: “May I have a bottle of Mich?”
B: “Are you twenty one?”
A: “No”
B: “No”
Interestingly this kind of center embedding can go on indefi nitely—naturally 
occurring cases of at least six degrees of center embedding have been found in 
conversation, far more complex than anything found in natural language syn-
tax where such embeddings are capped at level 3, and then only in written lan-
guage (see Levinson 2013b). A lot of ink has been spilt on why the limitation 
is found in syntax, and it is usually attributed to short-term memory problems. 
What is interesting, then, is that these limitations do not hold in a  joint task, 
even though each party must hold in mind the same pushdown stack model. 
This is a fi rst indication that there is something rather special about the hu-
man capacity for joint undertakings, something that seems to be largely absent 
from other species: it is a capacity to “distribute cognition” over individuals 
(Hollan et al. 2000; Hutchins 1995), thus allowing interactants to form a joint 
computational device, which seems able to overcome the stack-maintaining 
limitations of individuals.
Center embedding is also exploited for a fundamentally important func-
tion; namely, interactive repair. This typically involves a repair initiator (e.g., 
“huh”? or “what”?) from the recipient followed by a repeat or clarifi cation of 
what has just been said by the fi rst speaker. Repair becomes much more dif-
fi cult if displaced from the slot immediately after the troublesome turn. Thus 
there is pressure to solve  understanding or hearing problems as soon as pos-
sible. Without this basic repair mechanism, our understandings would rapidly 
diverge; repair, therefore, plays a crucial function in maintaining intersubjec-
tivity or mutual understanding, occurring roughly every 80 sec in any language 
(see Dingemanse et al. 2015). This kind of repair uses the “insert expansion” 
slot in Figure 8.2 and can be recursive, so this can get quite complex, as in the 
following center-embedded insert expansions (Merritt 1976; see also Levinson 
Pre-expansion FPP Insert expansion SPP Post-expansion
Base adjacency pair
Figure 8.2 Basic template for sequence organization. FPP marks the fi rst part of a 
paired sequence of actions, and SPP the second part, the paired response. Each expan-
sion type can also consist of pairs of actions. After Schegloff (2007).
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2013b), where the pushdown stack character is indicated by the indentation 
and line numbering:3
Exchange 2
S:  Next  Request to order
0 C: Roast beef on rye  Order
1 S:  Mustard or mayonnaise?  Q1
2 C:   Excuse me? Repair–Initiator (R1)
3 S:    What?  Repair–Initator (R2) on R1
3 C:    Excuse me? Repair of R2
2    I didn’t hear what you said
1 S:  Do you want mustard or mayonnaise?  Repair of Q1,   
   requested in R1
 C:  Mustard please.  A1 to Q1
0 S: ((provides))  Compliance with order in line 0
Other kinds of sequence exist. For example, one possibility is to exploit the 
preexpansion slot in the schema above (Figure 8.2), as in Exchange 3 (below), 
where a prior adjacency pair checks the preconditions for the main action (in 
this case, an offer). Here, the pre-FPP (“Say, whadja doing?”) is plausibly a 
pre-offer, but it could also be a pre-request (a preliminary to, e.g., “Want to 
come and help me clean up?”): B’s response is not a straight answer (compared 
to “doing homework” or the like), but is couched to encourage the following 
action, which has clearly been foreseen. Sequences thus involve a kind of look 
ahead, with responses geared to inferences about what is likely to be coming 
up next. From the perspective of artifi cial intelligence (AI), this can be thought 
of as  plan reconstruction: B infers that A has a plan to offer something nice, 
and so encourages it; likewise, A projects from B’s response that B intends to 
do nothing to impede the offer and is therefore likely to accept it. This mesh-
ing of mutually inferable plans is a crucial property of human interaction, both 
verbal and nonverbal (e.g., constructing something together) (Bangerter and 
Clark 2003).
Exchange 3
1 A: “Say, whadja doing?”
2 B: “Not much”
3 A: “Y’wanna drink?”
4 B: “Yeah”
3 One reviewer queried the recursive structure here, suggesting a possible list representation; 
see Levinson (2013b) for many examples, which I think have to be understood as interactively 
checking preconditions on preconditions on preconditions… (up to 6 deep) to actions. A list 
structure cannot capture the way in which each “push” has to have its own paired “pop,” as in 
the structure [A1 [B1 [C1…C2] B2] A2]; see Levinson (2013b).
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How exactly these plans are made mutually manifest, and how far downstream 
interlocutors predict the likely courses of action, is a puzzle (see Levinson 
2013a, b, 2017). Clearly, as in the example above, sequences may have a re-
current pattern, and just as observers of primate  behavior have noted under the 
rubric of ontogenetic ritualization,  the initial action can come to project the 
entire sequence. In human interaction, however, such projection is often much 
less clear, and as the potential ambiguity of the pre-offer/pre-request above 
indicates, the stakes for misconstruals can be relatively high.
In work we have conducted across languages and cultures, all of these pat-
terns ( turn-taking, repair, sequence organization) are strongly universal, fol-
lowing the same principles in many detailed ways (e.g., Dingemanse et al. 
2015; Kendrick et al., in prep.; Stivers et al. 2009). This contrasts markedly 
with the diversity of languages, which differ at every level, from the sound 
system, to the combinatorics involved in phonology, morphology and syntax, 
to the meanings that are conveyed. We believe these interactional principles 
form a strong infrastructure for language, which in turn makes the learning 
of languages possible and infl uences their structure in subtle ways. In addi-
tion, all spoken languages exhibit deep similarities in the use of multimodal 
resources despite the occasional cultural taboos to be found here:  gaze,  gesture, 
and  facial expressions play an important role in framing and supplementing the 
linguistic content.
The properties of human communicative interaction reviewed here can be 
abstracted into a set of design features (see Table 8.1). These are some of the 
basic desiderata that any interactive computational agent will either have to 
mimic or be endowed with ways to achieve equivalent  functionality. Table 8.1 
sketches the functions of each design feature, which we briefl y review. 
Multimodality offers redundancy or complementarity in, for instance, ges-
ture, facial expression, and speech. Crucially, the taking of short turns will 
make clear, in your immediate response, whether you understood me correctly 
(“legibility”). Action sequences, such as question–answer (Q–A), structure in-
teraction by setting up expectations for responses; note that in Exchange 1, the 
expectation can be postponed but still persists. Although spoken turns mini-
mize overlap, nonvocal signals (like laughing, smiling, shaking hands) may 
get their signifi cance precisely through simultaneity. Communication about the 
state of communication (metacommunication, as in repair initiators) plays a 
crucial cybernetic role in guiding utterance interpretation and signaling com-
municative success. The fact that conversation has an expected “clock speed” 
allows participants to sense an interpretative problem simply from a delayed 
response; the expected simultaneity of, for instance, laughter is a further check 
on temporal meshing.  Feedback signals like “mm-hmm” or nodding typically 
occur in overlap at the end of an utterance constituent, and their timing allows 
the speaker to proceed rapidly. None of this would work without a presumption 
of  engagement and engagability, which makes it possible to enter an interaction 
with a stranger on the street. This presumptive mutual regard and helpfulness 
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seems unique to humans, but of course is cemented when there are proximate 
shared goals or rewards. In general, for an interaction to work, each agent’s ac-
tions must be performed in such a way to make them legible (i.e., interpretable) 
as an action intended to be perspicuous for its purpose. This is obvious for 
communicative signals, but holds for other kinds of joint actions, so that when, 
for example, you and I carry a table together, the direction of my gaze can 
indicate the intended direction of motion. It follows that instrumental actions 
which are not part of the joint endeavor (e.g., scratching one’s head or cough-
ing) should also be clearly legible as irrelevant for the joint purpose in hand.
Table 8.1 Key design features of human interaction: a checklist for constructing intel-
ligent interactive agents.
1. Media
• Function: communication, redundancy Multimodal signals, language
2. Action sequences
a. Alternating turns Speech act mapped to language
• Function: includes legibility, opportu-
nities for repair
b. Action sequences Adjacency pairs (e.g., Q–A)
• Function: includes structuring 
exchange
Complex sequences, e.g., insert pairs (e.g., 
Q–Q–A–A)
c. Simultaneous
• Function: coordination, ritual
Complex sequences, e.g., shaking hands, 
laughing
3. Metacommunication
• Function: check communication Repair
• Function: confi rm message receipt  Feedback tokens, e.g., uhuh
4. Timing
• Function: indicates state of processing 
is “on time”
Turn-taking timing
• Function: “clock speed” check Synchronicity, e.g., shaking hands
• Function: “message received now” Timing of feedback
5.  Motivation
• Function: enter and maintain 
 engagement
Shared goals
 Affect/attachment, politeness, specifi c 
rewards
6. Legibility of
• Function in  attention: indicates current 
focus of processing
E.g.,  gaze readability
• Function in  intention: aid predictive 
processing
E.g.,  gesture signal vs. instrumental action
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Affect, Empathy, and the Human Person
A robotic assistant can clearly  be of great utility without having any deep  un-
derstanding of humans; after all,  humans will readily adapt to its limitations. 
But any machine that wishes to “pass” as capable of humanlike interactive task 
learning will have to know a great deal, not only about human communica-
tion but also about human nature. Human interaction is, in fact, replete with 
“ritual” aspects which no successful interactant can ignore. A century ago, the 
sociologist Durkheim (1912) suggested that religious  beliefs personify society, 
the collective consciousness of consciousness, as he put it, so that individu-
als come to have as social persons a kind of sacred quality. Goffman (1959) 
built on this in his analysis of “interaction ritual,” noting how we often treat 
persons with elaborate care: we pretend not to notice others’ slips, belittle our-
selves (e.g., walking into a lecture late, stooped over), and worry about our per-
ceived social competence to ensure that mutual dignity or “face” is maintained 
both by self and other on each other’s behalf. Brown and Levinson (1987) 
elaborated this account in a theory of “ politeness” in which individuals’ ritual 
or “face” requirements could be maintained in two rather different ways: by 
claiming empathy and fellowship (Durkheim’s “positive rites”) or by giving 
the other maximum Lebensraum (Durkheim’s negative rites or avoidance ritu-
als). Which kind of ritual is deployed depends on social closeness versus social 
distance (vertical or horizontal), together with some measure of the weighti-
ness of the action or imposition. This translates directly into the choice of lin-
guistic expressions: if I want to borrow the pen of my neighbor in a plane to 
fi ll out a landing form, I might say “Hey, I need your pen for a moment” if he’s 
a friend, but “Excuse me, could I possibly borrow your pen just to fi ll in this 
form?” if he’s a stranger. Although the whole business is wrapped up in  cul-
ture-specifi c conventions (e.g., the bowing and honorifi cs of Japanese), there 
does seem to be a universal basis to these mini-rituals of the person. Further 
corpus work suggests that in choosing linguistic expressions we make quite 
elaborate computations of rights and duties, epistemic territories or domains of 
expertise, and estimations of effort or contingency (Drew and Couper-Kuhlen 
2014). We do this because the failure to recognize the other’s right to self-
esteem is cause for offence; thus, one works with what Goffman (1959) called 
“the virtual offence” (the worst construal of what one is doing) and tries to 
stop it from happening. When it is necessary to invade another’s domain, as in 
medical examinations, elaborate circumspection is required.
An aspect of recognizing the other as a “sacred being” is the recognition 
of the need for empathy among close associates. Failure to greet a person or 
omitting to extend condolences or congratulations is also cause for offence, as 
is the failure to laugh at people’s jokes, appreciate their stories, or empathize 
with their travails. Interacting successfully with a child may involve entering, 
for a while, into its momentary make-believe world. In general, any interac-
tional success here will be achieved by keeping tabs on the life courses of 
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all signifi cant others. Interestingly, it is also crucial to keep track of common 
ground—the things we have told each other—requiring a record of informa-
tional exchange (complete with the reference forms used) for each such person. 
Failure to do so will have you classifi ed as the party bore or the senile kinsman 
who repeats information already imparted. All this is self-evident to us, but 
will likely be opaque to an interactional machine: it will not be feasible to build 
in all the sensitivities and particularities of the social world that parameterize 
underlying social principles. Perhaps some future machines will be able to 
learn some of these mores, although that, in itself, poses formidable inferential 
problems of the kind explored in studies of child development. Still, modeling 
the stiff politeness of anonymous service staff may be within our grasp and a 
likely prerequisite for a successful interactive robot.
Learning Interactively
Understanding how new tasks can be learned in and through interaction is the 
focus of this volume. From experiments on joint action, it seems that coop-
erative interaction relies on each participant modeling the other’s unfolding 
action plans, transposing themselves into the other’s footsteps as it were, and 
so co-representing the joint action. This seems to be so even if my half of the 
 joint task has an independent timing and function (Sebanz et al. 2003, 2006; 
Vesper et al. 2016).
There have been interesting reports from cross-cultural studies of societies 
where children, for example, acquire most adult tasks simply through observa-
tion, not instruction or demonstration (Gaskins 1999; Rogoff et al. 2003). So 
how important communication, or indeed interaction, is in learning new tasks 
is perhaps not clear. In an interesting preliminary study, Laland and associates 
tested the learning of fl int-tool knapping under different conditions: reverse 
engineering (by inspection of the tool), emulation (by watching production), 
restricted gestural communication, and vocal communication (Morgan et al. 
2015). They found that the task was easily learned only when there was full 
communication, because certain critical tricks are not easily extracted through 
direct observation (e.g., in this fl int-knapping case, preparing a striking plat-
form under 90 degrees). More studies of this kind are needed, with different 
types of tasks, but generally this work suggests that directed communication 
may often be essential to the learning of skills.
Here I would like to make the point that any kind of sustained cooperative 
interaction presupposes  communication, even if it is subliminal. For instance, 
maintaining synchrony in a chamber orchestra involves visual cues, as in the 
exaggerated, but precise, lifting of a bow to indicate an impending entrance 
(“now is when we begin, at this tempo”); carrying a table together involves 
some low-level signaling of direction (“go left now”), evidenced by an exag-
gerated tilt of the head to the left. These signals work by having a shape that 
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is not purely instrumental: the exaggeration of bow movement beyond what is 
needed for sound production or the tipping of the table greater than is needed 
to get around the corner. The detection of the not-just-instrumental quality of a 
basically instrumental action can be very subtle but allows our species to  col-
laborate in a coordinated fashion (see Bangerter and Clark 2003;  Grice 1975 
on the Maxim of Manner). More generally, if there is a way to indicate “this is 
the way to do it” by the manner of doing, it may play a crucial role in human 
 cultural  transmission. This kind of signaling has been turned into a theory of 
“ natural pedagogy” (Csibra and Gergely 2009), and the distinction between in-
strumental and noninstrumental action has been held to be central to the learn-
ing of culture, where both causally transparent and causally opaque actions 
need to be learned; unlike instrumental activities, table manners, for instance, 
should be followed, not innovated or improved upon (Clegg and Legare 2016).
The Cognition behind the Ethology: The Gulf 
between AI and Human Interaction
It is not easy to reconstruct the underlying cognition that makes human interac-
tion possible. Apparently, effortless coordination requires complex inference: 
if we are putting together an IKEA bookshelf, and I put the screwdriver down 
with the handle toward you, I may be signalling what you need next (Bangerter 
and Clark 2003). Such wordless  communication is challenging to model. The 
philosophical reconstruction by Grice (1975) remains the best general attack 
we have: the signaler intends to cause an effect in the mind of the recipient just 
by getting the recipient to recognize that  intention. But how does this happen? 
The general answer seems to be: by an infl ection of manner that suggests the 
action was not purely instrumental. Why take the extra effort to turn around 
the screwdriver? Alternatively, take the case of a student who arrives late to 
class with a cappuccino moustache: a fellow student might vigorously wipe 
her own lip while gazing across at the new arrival, such that the latecomer 
wonders, “Why is she doing that?” This may lead to the realization that there 
is something anomalous about the latecomer’s own lip. This seems to work 
by an implicit comparison to the simplest instrumental version of the action: 
any excessive elaboration of manner suggests communicative intent. This kind 
of incidental communication lies behind nearly all our coordination: I wait to 
walk across the road at a junction until I have caught the driver’s eye, so that 
he and I both know we are aware of each other, and it’s safe to cross the road 
(building on the assumption of our common minds and bodies, in a way that is 
inherently problematic for a robot).
The Gricean analysis involves refl exive ratiocination: I plan my signal 
with its manner infl ection thinking that you will reconstruct the communica-
tive intention behind it, realizing it is a signal and not (or not only) an in-
strumental action (thanks to the manner infl ection). Many psychologists have 
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been doubtful of any such thing, pointing instead to our tendency for lazy 
 egocentricity. To explore this, we designed the following task (de Ruiter et al. 
2010): two players took turns to signal where the other should place a  gaming 
piece on a checkerboard. They were denied all means of direct communication 
and could only indicate by the manner of moving their own piece where the 
other player should place hers. Indeed, one of them was in an fMRI scanner. 
Participants could solve the task, even though each trial had different proper-
ties that denied them the possibility of forming implicit conventions: they did 
so by choosing a route for their own piece that went over the square where the 
other should place her piece, and wiggling or rotating or otherwise by man-
ner infl ection indicating the solution. What we found is that the mentalizing 
brain areas activated by the signaler were refl ected in the areas activated in the 
recipient, prima facie evidence that we do indeed attempt to mirror the other 
person’s reasoning (de Ruiter et al. 2010; Noordzij et al. 2009). It would seem 
to work by an abductive leap from the mannered signal to the sender’s likely 
 intention, but an adequate computational model eludes us. Blokpoel (2015) 
proves formally that the inferences required are intractable (NP-hard) unless 
the set of goals and signals are highly constrained (see also Van Rooij et al. 
2011). Attempts to model the interpretation of  nonce or “one-off” signals by 
analogy also prove problematic (Blokpoel 2015).
These results hold just as much for linguistic communication as they do for 
nonce, nonconventional communication. That is because the point or speech 
act of an utterance is rarely explicit: the relations between linguistic form and 
speech acts are many-to-many (Levinson 2017). Consider “Say, whadja do-
ing?” in Exchange 3 (above), which has the superfi cial form of a question, but 
its purpose is to pre-adumbrate an invitation or suggestion, a purpose perspicu-
ous to the answerer: “Nothing much.” The reconstruction of its intended point 
requires a projection of an upcoming sequence (offer and acceptance); that is, 
it involves  plan reconstruction and plan-meshing, as illustrated in Figure 8.3. 
Here, from the utterance “Whadja doing?” Clara detects a possible plan to in-
vite her out (the pre-invitation reading of the utterance), so she answers in such 
a way as to make clear that she has no impediments and is likely to accept (the 
go-ahead reading of her response, “Not much”). This kind of plan reconstruc-
tion was explored in early AI but has proved computationally tractable only 
when the alternatives were highly constrained (Allen and Perrault 1980), as 
Blokpoel’s (2015) theoretical work predicts.
At present I believe we simply do not have adequate computational tools 
to model the mysteries of human communication, which fall in the domain of 
“the inference to the best explanation” or inspired abduction under an umbrella 
of refl exive  reasoning. This is the kind of reasoning successfully employed 
in Schelling games of pure coordination, where we both get a prize if we can 
think of the same number without communicating (Schelling 1960).
We come now to the computational tractability of the ethological proper-
ties, like multimodality and  turn-taking discussed above. Turn-taking with its 
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Go out
with Clara
“Whatja doin’?” ?Q + Pre-invite












Figure 8.3 Sequence organization as  plan reconstruction (from Levinson 2017).
split-second turnaround poses problems of sheer processing power. To respond, 
I argue, you must compute (most likely predict) the intended point or speech 
act of the incoming utterance early enough to begin your response prepara-
tion well before the end of the incoming turn. This problem is fraught with 
the many-to-many mapping between utterance and action mentioned above. 
Again, we can show the inference is often made very early using brain imaging 
(Gisladottir et al. 2015). In the case of responses to prior utterances, decisions 
about the speech act may be made by the fi rst word.  Comprehension is a mas-
sively parallel undertaking, which helps to explain its speed. In addition, the 
pace is pressured by the fact that delay has its own semiotics: a delay over 500 
msec after a request, for example, will be interpreted as reluctance to comply; 
using brain imaging, one can track the hearer’s moment-by-moment change of 
expectations (Bögels et al. 2015a).
In the end,  linguistic production has to be serial due to the articulation bot-
tleneck (Indefrey 2011), as refl ected by the relatively huge latencies involved 
in linguistic encoding. The decision about how to respond, which words and 
sentence frames to employ, would counterfactually predict very slow responses 
(consider the psychological generalization known as Hick’s Law, which holds 
that response times increase logarithmically with the number of possible re-
sponses from which to choose, and the 30,000 odd items in the average vo-
cabulary). So, even though production latencies are large (up to 1500+ msec 
to code a simple clause), given the vast decision trees possible, they are still 
remarkable.
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Multimodality compounds these problems, because one is dealing with the 
orchestration of a veritable ensemble of channels. For instance, recent work 
shows that
• long blinks toward the end of an utterance signal “go on” (Hömke et 
al. 2017),
•  gesture holds signal “turn unfi nished” (Torreira and Valtersson 2015),
•  gaze aversion by responder signals “this is not the response you were 
hoping for” (Kendrick and Holler 2017), and
• frowns on a recipient or her head thrust and freeze of body position 
signal “repair request coming” (Floyd et al. 2016; Kendrick 2015).
These signals often overlap with the verbal signal, and the main clue to their 
scope is probably timing. As in the  McGurk effect,4 it is likely that such timing 
can be delayed by up to 200 msec without disrupting a sense of synchroniza-
tion. While massive parallel computation may again solve the  comprehension 
problem, the orchestrated production of these signals by an early utterance 
plan is not understood at all (for a discussion on gesture planning, see de Ruiter 
et al. 2012).
All this takes place within the  multitasking environment of  turn-taking, 
where halfway through an incoming turn a person is already planning a re-
sponse. Figure 8.4 models this and is based on the processing of the “crunch 
zone,” the latter part of an incoming turn (see Figure 8.1). Here, Bob is listen-
ing to Anne’s turn; during the incoming turn, he fi rst concentrates on compre-
hending what she is saying. As soon as he grasps the essential point or speech 
act, Bob calls on his production machinery and begins to formulate a response. 
This goes all the way down the chute to be clothed in the phonology and ar-
ticulatory programs. Meanwhile, he is still listening to Anne and parsing the 
incoming turn, looking for points of possible syntactic completion, the end 
of a possible turn. As soon as one of these is detected, he checks for prosodic 
(or gestural) cues to turn closure. When such prosodic cues are detected, he 
launches his response. Given the natural limit to human response times, the 
response will emerge around 200 msec after the end of Anne’s turn (as in the 
mode of the typical response times, shown in the inset histogram).
The upshot of this is that we may be deeply skeptical whether a machine 
can model all these processes in real time, in a way that could match a human 
interactant. “ Deep learning” on vast databases of interactive discourse may 
help to capture interactive routines, but there is no prospect of a solution to the 
creative abduction of “the inference to the best explanation” under refl exive 
reasoning, the  Gricean inference to intent, in the split-second manner typi-
cal of human interaction. Above all, we still have only the poorest descriptive 
4 This is the effect where visual lip reading interacts with the acoustic signal to produce a blend-
ed perception, allowing fruitful experimentation of multimodal processing. Another unsolved 
problem is what counts as synchronization with nested structures; for example, an indexical 
point with “Is that big red truck over there John’s?”
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Figure 8.4 How comprehension calls production midway through an incoming turn 
(from Levinson and Torreira 2015).
coverage, let alone understanding, of the many features that generate human 
communicative interaction.
Fortunately, this does not spell doom for interactional robotics. There are 
two saving graces. First, humans are good at adapting their interaction to in-
teractants with lesser skills:  to infants, children, foreign language learners, and 
even dogs. A very useful exercise would be to try to work out exactly which 
properties of human interaction are indispensable, and through which outputs 
these would best be embodied in an interacting machine (for suggestions, see 
Thomaz et al., this volume). Second, humans have a natural instinct to attri-
bute deep interactive cognition to simple machines, lower animals, and even 
causal events without any cognition involved. It is this tendency that makes hu-
mans susceptible to superstition,  religion, witchcraft, and animism (Levinson 
1995, 2006). The very properties that make human interaction possible are 
freely read into the world around us. This accounts for some of the signal 
achievements in robotic interaction, as in the fi nding that autistic children are 
brought out of their interactive shells by playing with robots (for a review, 
see Diehl et al. 2012). It also accounts for our wonder, like Ovid’s Pygmalion 
falling in love with his sculptural bride, at our abilities to make even shallow 
simulacra: the medieval fascination with automata (Truit 2015) or “Erica” in 
Ishiguro’s  Symbiotic Human–Robot Interaction Project (Glas et al. 2016). In 
restricted domains (e.g., travel agencies, directory enquiries), where specifi c 
human goals can be presumed, robotic performance can pass muster because 
we imagine greater competence than is actually present. Such bridgeheads will 
help to increase the utility of our machine companions, but we should not 
delude ourselves that we can really simulate the complex behavior that we 
126 S. C. Levinson 
instinctively produce in our own actions, of which we have only the slightest 
analytical grasp.
Conclusion
Human social  interaction is our elite capacity. Other species have spectacular 
navigation abilities, the ability to sleep on the wing, or swim faster than a 
frigate, but our highly evolved trick is communicative interaction. This has 
made  cultural  transmission possible and has propelled us into the position of 
the dominant species on the planet. The ingredients of this elite capacity are 
scarcely understood, but they include capacities to model each other’s plans 
and actions, to foresee them, and to plan ahead accordingly. Human commu-
nication is based on this: given the asymmetry in processing latencies in  com-
prehension and production, the only way we can maintain the observed pace 
of communicative interaction is by predictive comprehension and preemptive 
production. The modeling of another’s actions requires deep knowledge of the 
individual (in the case of known social others) and extensive cultural expecta-
tions, including interpersonal  rituals in all cases. The speed and depth of com-
putation is not likely to be matched by any machine in our lifetimes. Perhaps in 
some future world, it may be partially modeled by “breeding” machines using 
an analogue to unnatural selection, Darwin’s selective breeding, to recapitulate 
the evolution of our elite capacity. In the meantime,  human–machine interac-
tion can trade on our charitable overattribution of interactional intelligence to 
anything that moves or squawks.
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